THE GORDON REVIEW

VOL. I NO. 3 SEPTEMBER, 1955

Editor
LLOYD F. DEAN

Assistant Editors
PHILIP C. JOHNSON
C. MILBURN KEEN, JR.
THOMAS H. LEITH

Business Manager
DONALD F. TWEEDIE, JR.

Subscription Rates
U.S. and Possessions

Single Copy	$ .75
1 year	2.00

Foreign Countries

Single Copy	$ .75
1 year	2.75

Address all correspondence to:

GORDON REVIEW
Beverly Farms, Mass.

Contents

Science, Christianity, and World Catastrophe
Wilbur L. Bullock 82

Sociology: Science or Chicanery?
Carmen C. Decker 90

Language and Theology: Some Basic Considerations
Richard K. Curtis 97

Personalia 109

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

STONEHOUSE J. GRESHAM MACHEN: A BIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR
Lloyd F. Dean 112

KIK REVELATION TWENTY, AN EXPOSITION

EHRICH RELATIVE CHRONOLOGIES IN OLD WORLD ARCHEOLOGY
Philip C. Johnson 113

YOUNG A CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY
Donald Tweedie, Jr. 114

HUXLEY *et al.* EVOLUTION AS A PROCESS
Thomas H. Leith 116

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES 117
Thomas H. Leith

The GORDON REVIEW is published quarterly by members of the College faculty.
Printed in U.S.A.

SCIENCE, CHRISTIANITY, AND WORLD CATASTROPHE*

WILBUR L. BULLOCK

Dr. Vannevar Bush in a lecture before a meeting of The American Association for the Advancement of Science in Berkely, California on December 30, 1954 summarized mankind's present dilemma in the following words:

> The prevailing mood of our society before the first World War was one of complacent expectation that all things would improve perpetually. Retrogression, at least, was unthinkable.
> But the first World War shook our optimism, the depression shook it further, and the second War nearly destroyed it. Now, though we may still hope that our race will go forward in progress, we are confronted with facts that take all the former exuberance out of our hope, reducing it almost to a wish of despair. This is especially so in regard to moral and political affairs. For who can have confidence in humanity's future when he looks at events of the past twenty years? Belsen and Buchenwald were poor exhibits of humanitarian progress by any standards recognized in the nineteenth century. And it is difficult to see much to choose between the erratic tyranny of the Czars and the systematic tyranny of the present Russian government, with its purges and brainwashings. Our wonted spirit of optimism has given way largely to a spirit of gloom, and some among us seem to be gradually moving toward a definite philosopy of pessimism.[1]

From nearly all intellectual circles today comes the same picture of gloom, the same disillusionment, the same lack of confidence in the unimpeded progress of modern man. Indeed, one common evaulation of our present state is that the social sciences have lagged too far behind the natural sciences or, to put it more bluntly, man's moral condition is far short of his technological achievements.

As educated, evangelical Christians who have or have had contact with this despondent, intellectual world and who do or will have associations with the rank and file of the human race in our respective communities, we must face up to the challenge of this situation. We must seek the answers to the following questions. What was the role of science in getting us into this predicament and how far can it go in getting us out? Secondly, can responsibility be placed on the Christian church for this unpleasant situation and does the church have a solution?

In examining the questions relative to science we ought first to see what science really is. Science has been defined as "the accumulation of useful knowledge". (As a research scientist whose research interests lie in areas of only slight practical concern, I should point out that the ad-

jective "useful" need not imply an *immediate* utility). However, we should all agree that such an objective as the accumulation of knowledge constitutes an important phase of searching for truth. Such a search involves the honesty and integrity of those who are doing the searching.

*This paper was originally read before the Annual Meeting of The Society of Phi Alpha Chi, the scholastic honor society of Gordon College and Gordon Divinity School, on June 3, 1955.

Actually, such basic honesty is as vital a part of science as it is of theology; and, in actual practice, due to the lack of moral repercussions of most scientific experiments, scientists have more consistently carried out this aspect than have many theologians. To the research worker any new truth uncovered in the laboratory must be made known no matter what current hypotheses it may contradict. Generally, the rate of acceptance of the new truth is directly proportional to the evidence presented in its support and the degree to which the experiment can be duplicated.

A second feature of science is that it is concerned directly or indirectly with the control of the earth and its natural forces for the benefit a man. Such a program is involved in the initial charge given to man by God in the Garden of Eden (Gen. 1: 28, 29) and as such cannot be inherently evil. While we can see many blunders and costly mistakes in the history of man's control of nature, our present day technological standing in agriculture, medicine and engineering is vital testimony to the ability by which man has been able to have dominion over the works of God.

Third, it should be noted, in the words of Toynbee, that there is a close relation between the developement of this technology in our western civilization and our Christian moral background.

> Western technology and science originated as by-products of western moral virtues, and they could never have come to fruition if these virtues had not begotten them. They are outward visible signs of inward spiritual graces; a devotion to truth that is prepared to follow an argument honestly, wherever it may lead; an ideal of integrity in workmanship; and perhaps above all, a feeling of charity for one's momentary opponent.[2]

Wherein has science failed that we are now afraid of the very things which we have made? The failure lies not in the study of science but rather in the moral nature of the people who benefit from the scientist's research as well as the moral nature of the scientists themselves — in short, the failure is the direct effect of the depravity of the entire human race. In this technologically minded age there has arisen a cult of scien-

tism that has attempted to tell us that all these glorious scientific achievements prove that we will ultimately solve the world's problems by our own powers. As we learn more we will improve ourselves, and hence hasten our inevitable progress. Such a view is far from being limited to scientists, and in its worst forms, as they occur in Sunday supplements and other popular writings, it is utilized by nonscientific people for the advancement of their own humanistic notions.

Another extreme has appeared since the second World War which should be equally distressing to Christians. We frequently hear that the atom bomb is evil; it was created by scientists, therefore, the scientists are evil. But atomic energy provides only another in the long series of illustrations of how God has given to man potentiality for wonderful control of his environment, but how the moral depravity of a sinful race inevitably causes these powers to be used for evil. All of us are aware of moral abuses in such everyday twentieth century items as automobiles, radios, and television sets. On the other hand, we should be equally aware of the tremendous potential for good that is inherent in our understanding of atomic energy. The guilt for the cruel misuse of the forces and material that God has placed at our disposal lies with the entire human race and not alone with the small group of men whose task it has been to apply their specialized knowledge to the task of national survival.

However, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the control of nature, wonderful though the achievements have been, is not the solution to all the world's ills. Natural man is faced with the distressing paradox of being able to harness so much of the forces of nature yet being unable to control his own wickedness. In contrast to the optimistic humanism of half a century ago, many of the leaders of today are seriously questioning whether this generation will survive to pass on the beneficial aspects of our culture to our children.

It should be apparent that science, as the accumulation of useful knowledge, is not responsible for our current dilemma and cannot furnish a solution. The basic problem is a moral bankruptcy that requires either an extremely blind optimism to ignore or a superhuman spiritual awakening to solve. Meanwhile, the ever increasing control of our environment and the subsequent strain this control places on our moral nature are hastening the day when some drastic change for better or worse must occur. We need not, in a group such as this, say too much about the nature of the Christian church throughout the course of history. Convinced that God has through the years maintained for Himself "a peculiar people" who love and trust Him, we at the same time recognize the weaknesses and blunders of these people and the growth of tares that

have diluted and corrupted the basic truths of the Scriptures. As we consider the problem that is before us today we must recognize this weakness in the Christian church as a human institution. We must further recognize the gulf that must exist between the unchangeable, perfect God and His servants who are, in every age, still possessed of a sinful nature.

What then has been the position of the Christian church as civilization has trod the road to destruction at an increasingly rapid rate? It should be apparent that, although the Lord's people have often made a tremendous impact for good, being on the Lord's side has not always resulted in the self-denying activities that characterize the truly godly of all ages. We have not always been on the side of moral progress nor have we always been able to free ourselves from the pitfalls of our own particular age.

We need only to look back at the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, the use of the prison and the sword in the days of the reformers, the witch hunts of some of our Puritan forefathers here in New England, and the existence of racial and other prejudices amongst God's people today to realize that all too often we conform to the world rather than to the Lord. We are swept along by the current of the times rather than anchored securely in the basic concepts of God's written word. Those who are more concerned with the course of history, including the history of the church, could supply us with many more examples to prove that the Christian church has followed all too closely the paths of the Old Testament Israelites. We will leave to these historians the task of evaluating in detail our past in order to enlighten us for the future.

To this point we have seen that the human quest for control of the natural world has produced knowledge and power that, because of our moral depravity, threatens our very existence. We have seen that the Christian church, while often a force for good, has allowed itself to become permeated by the thinking and customs of the unregenerate world to the point that we actually become partners with the world in their program of self-destruction. Is there any hope? What bearing, if any, does the old, classical controversy between science and the Christian religion have on the present dilemma?

But perhaps we should first ask ourselves the frank question: What good is our Christian faith in these distressing times? In order to answer such a question it is imperative that we restate the essentials of our faith. It is even more imperative that we seek to *apply* them to the present

situation and realize that each one of us as an individual is a part of this situation and, as such, accountable to God.

As we look at the world after two world wars and under the threat of a third, we cannot help but be impressed with the reality of sin. This lack of conformity to, this rebellion against the laws of God is all too obvious a factor in this problem. But as with the people of God in any age, we can be useful in His plan only if our first concern is to recognize that this sin is a basic part of our own nature. We must realize with the prophet Isaiah that *we*, as individual Christians, are people of unclean lips as well as dwelling in the midst of a people of unclean lips. Too often have we assumed the self-righteous, pharisaical attitude of thinking of sin as something that is obvious in everybody else but ourselves. We have accused the evolutionist of devising a satanic theory while we fight this theory with misrepresented facts, half-truths, and misquoted scripture references taken out of context. If materialistic evolution (for example) must be refuted, and I believe it must, we must do it patiently, honestly, and even lovingly in order that the truth may be manifest in our actions as well as in our words.

In addition to our awareness of our own sinful nature, we must also be aware of the foundation stone of our faith — that this sinful nature can be reclaimed only thru faith in Jesus Christ. As in the case of the concept of sin, we give lip-service to our faith in Christ as the *only* basis of salvation, and then proceed to describe a Christian in terms of an individual who does not smoke, dance, go to the movies, etc. While it might be argued that these prohibitions are merely outward manifestations of a "true Christian," they cannot be defended specifically, from Scripture. Indeed, they must be recognized for what they function as: pharisaical platitudes that make *us* look better than other people while blinding us to the truth about ourselves and to our utter dependence upon Christ. Without a recommitment to the true and fundamental principles of Biblical truth we cannot offer any hope to the world.

When we speak of hope, as Christians, we most often think in terms of the second coming of our Lord. The doctrine of the second coming is certainly a cardinal concept in Scriptural teaching. But more important it is one of the most blessed assurances given to the Christian church — that the Lord who went away will someday come again and receive us unto Himself. Yet, even here, Satan has enticed us into paths of error. We spend more time delving into the details (often imaginary) of His coming than in realizing that His coming again is doctrinally related to our sinfulness and His role as our Saviour.

What is more, too often we look upon this blessed truth as an escape rather than a comfort associated with responsibility — the charge to witness for Christ and to preach the Gospel till He comes. And, as with other deep truths, this doctrine has become a means of dividing God's people. We need to reaffirm our faith in Christ's return but with the humble realization of the responsibility that accompanies such a doctrine of comfort.

As a final essential of our faith we must reaffirm our belief in the basic infallibility of Scripture. This concept of Biblical infallibility, however, can be dangerous. It has probably led God's people into more pitfalls than almost any other. It is easy to "stand on the Book," but it is no easy matter carefully to separate what the Book says and means from what we have been taught to believe that it says and means. We need only to recall the dire predictions of the downfall of the entire Christian system of doctrine if Copernican astronomy were adopted. And yet now all Christians accept this concept of astronomy and some even see it proven from Scripture. We could go on and give examples from other areas, such as the "Scriptural proofs" for and against slavery, the "Scriptural" concept of the fixity of species, and many others. However, it may be sufficient to quote from Butterfield's *Christianity and History* to summarize the problems that a self-centered approach to inspiration can produce:

> The perfect parable for those who are interested in the relations between religion and any form of science is provided by the conflict between Galileo and the Church on the subject of the rotation of the earth. On the one hand Galileo's conduct in the particular circumstance of the case required — if he was to be justified — that he should make good his claim that he had actually demonstrated the earth's motion; but, as he imagined that the action of the tides was the clinching argument which proved his thesis, he was wrong at the critical point — mistaken in his science and premature in his dogmatism. On the other hand it is clear from Galileo's case as well as many others, that much unnecessary anguish has been produced for Christians throughout the ages because the Church has so often imagined the gospel to be tied to the science of a particular epoch (Aristotelian physics, and Ptolemaic astronomy for example), with the result that men have felt that the one must stand or fall with the other. On both sides of the Galileo controversy, therefore, we see a little of that intellectual arrogance, or mental rigidity, or stiff-necked self-assurance which manages to interpolate itself into all forms of scholarship and science. If anybody were to doubt the existence of this, it is always sufficiently evident when we turn back to examine the dogmatisms of scholarship in any generation previous to our own.[3]

But a mere return to the essentials of a doctrinal system is not enough. On the basis of these essentials the Christian church has been

given a responsibility by its Lord and Master — the responsibility to witness to the truth and power of this system by word and deed. Yet, as we have ignored and distorted the essentials, so we have neglected and perverted the witness of the gospel. We find ourselves faced today with an ever increasing ignorance of the Bible — its most elementary and long-loved stories, to say nothing of its most important truths. As we have contact with young people in our colleges and universities, as well as those who have never been in an institution of higher learning, we are appalled at the lack of understanding of the Christian faith. And these are not people who have lost their faith because of attendance at atheistic, secular institutions. They *came* to college without any understanding of the message of the Bible in its most fundamental applications to themselves or to the western culture of which they are a part.

Of even greater concern should be the people from our conservative, evangelical churches who claim to know Christ and have little or no interest in the Scriptures. Somehow, we have made the marvelous grace of God whereby we "accept Christ" into an oversimplified motto. There are many unbelievers who realize more clearly than many Christians that it "costs" to follow Christ. And it costs in terms of continual self-discipline and growth rather than increasing the list of "don'ts" that are so popular in evangelical circles.

As we fail to spread the gospel by our ignorance of the Word, so too we fail to live *in deed* as true ambassadors for Christ. To some the epitome of a successful witness is to "come out from among them and be separate" in the pharasaical tradition of the "holier than thou" variety. Equally disturbing are those who see no need for any separation from the world, as well as those who consider conservative, nineteenth century Americanism as synonymous with true, Biblical Christianity.

Such inadequacies in the testimony of the church are met all too often in the area of the relationship of science and our Christian faith. Because the essentials of our faith are clear and simple we fail to recognize that, although our reconciliation to God is a matter of simple faith, our understanding of God's works as we study them in nature may be completely inadequate to justify many of the sweeping conclusions we have drawn. We have rebelled at scientific dogma while we have, in many instances, embraced a superficial pseudotheological dogma that makes the simple truths of God's word repulsive and absurd. We fail to appreciate how little of the sum total of truth we know.

Because of the seriousness of the situation as it is accompanied by moral backwardness and intellectual blindness, we must be prepared to

re-evaluate all concepts constantly. Since World War II we have had to re-evaluate our concepts of foreign mission work in the light of widespread nationalism. We have finally awakened to the desperate need of separating twentieth century Americanism from Biblical Christianity.

So it must be in the church's relation to science at this critical period. In my own field we have hardly scratched the surface in a scholarly re-evaluation of the concept of evolution. Most Christian pronouncements on this subject exhibit a pathetic ignorance of modern concepts. In these days of Mayr, Goldschmidt, and Dobzhansky, many Christians are still battling Huxley, Haeckel and Darwin without any understanding of the tremendous changes that have occurred in the intervening seventy-five years. Only an honest investigation of the problem can be of any value.

But can Christianity, any more than science, prevent world catastrophe? Or perhaps it might be better to ask: Should it try? Certainly on the basis of the Scriptural concept of conflict between the church and the world there is good reason to believe that there is little possibility of averting catastrophe by any world-church alliance. In the realm of science, we see the world advancing in its goal to control nature. In the church we see the activity of the Lord to demonstrate His plan of reconciliation. But in this fleshly existence neither science nor church will ever be complete or perfect. Therefore, in accordance with Bible prophecy, neither science nor church in themselves can prevent catastrophe. Only if in the providence of God there should be a tremendous spiritual awakening to revitalize the degenerate moral fiber of man, would there be any hope of preventing (better: delaying) the approaching catastrophe.

But such a spectre means that we, as Christ's ambassadors, must tend to our lamps. The time is too late for sleeping or the petty bickering that has all too often been involved in problems of science and Christianity. We must search our own souls before God so that He can, if it is His will, use us to lead some to escape catastrophe.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Bush, Vannevar, "Science and Progress." *American Scientist*, 43(2)1955, p. 243.
[2] Toynbee, Arnold, "A Turning Point in Man's Destiny." *New York Times Magazine*, 12/26/55.
[3] Butterfield, H., *Christianity and History*, p. 10.

SOCIOLOGY: SCIENCE OR CHICANERY?

CARMEN C. DECKER

Sociology had its earliest beginnings when man began to reflect and generalize about such things as social reality and human interrelationships. Ever since man has existed there is evidence to the effect that he has reflected upon himself as an object.[1] It is probable also that the study of man in some form is one of the oldest of human preoccupations. Quite late in his history were these reflections turned toward man as a cooperating member in group action, and his part in that action. Only quite recently have these generalizations risen above the level of folk wisdom and aspired, under the title of "sociology" to become a scholarly discipline. In its bid for recognition on the scholarly level as science, sociology is now entering its "times of troubles" just as all other branches of science have done in their long journey from folk lore to scientific certainty. Before astonomy, man believed in astrology; before chemistry, in alchemy; and before medicine, in the quackery of the witch-doctor. In its day of ascendency, as it reaches toward achievement of scientific certainty, sociology is also climbing the steep, rugged incline from aggregated folk wisdom. It has not been an easy road, nor is it at this time a finished journey. Reasons as diverse as those once encountered by biology, chemistry, or astronomy have been given as causes for its exclusion from the category of sciences. But one cannot help being impressed that there is something deeper than these.

Several years ago Pitirim A. Sorokin published a book entitled *The Reconstruction of Humanity* for the purpose of applying sociological theory to the problems of a sick world. In the same year Arnold J. Toynbee brought out *Civilization on Trial* in which he attempted the same thing through application of a philosophy of history to the solution to world problems. In reviewing these two volumes, Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes said:

> The main difficulties in this relatively new branch of social science lay in the fact that so many sociologists had formerly been preachers of the gospel or theologically trained and carried their religious and hortatory attitudes over into sociology. Today, the trend seems to be reversed, and many sociologists are now becoming preachers even though they may not speak from a formal pulpit. This latter turn has been even more unfortunate, for the sociologist-preachers of a half century ago . . . made a sincere and usually successful effort to acquire some grasp on social science. Today our sociologists turned preachers seem bent on repudiating the social science of which they were once masters.[2]

There is a good historical background for Dr. Barnes' statement, whether one agrees with his opinion or not. Sociology was born in the manse, and savors of the cloth. Prior to 1920, most eminent sociologists came from rural and religious backgrounds. They were almost without exception concerned with ethical values. Of these early sociologists, three came from ministers' families: Lester F. Ward, Franklin H. Giddings, and William I. Thomas. At least eight others, viz., William G. Sumner, Albion W. Small, George E. Vincent, Edward C. Hays, James P. Lichtenberger, Ulysses G. Weatherby, Charles A. Ellwood, and John L. Gillen, had been active ministers and left their pulpits to enter the field of sociology.[3]

With this background, it is only natural that early sociological interpretation of the rapidly industrialized, materialistic urbanization of Western Civilization should have a rural and religious emphasis. There was also a strong belief in other things, no longer greatly emphasized, such as natural law, social Darwinism (and its yoke-fellow, progressive social change), and social reformation in all pre-World War I sociological thinking. Just as such men as Beard in political science, Robinson in history, Veblin in economics, Holmes in law, and most of all, Dewey in philosophy and education; sociologists either had to change their theory or their profession. But, like Dewey, most of them tried to revise their thinking to fit into the new order.[4]

This reconstruction of sociological theory tended to substitute the law of change for natural law; statistical measurement for common sense thought; scientific certainty and rigid, objective application for value judgements; and to crowd out all vestiges of rural and religious emphasis by accepting an almost fatalistic materialism. To this second generation group, sociology was to be a science, and as such, an end in itself. The ivory tower succeeded the pulpit; measuring instruments displaced common sense values, and measurements for purposes of prediction crowded out Ellwood's idea of sociology as a method of understanding and solving social problems. Social phenomena were investigated merely as the stuff of knowledge for knowledge's sake.

If perchance a sociologist so far forgot himself in his role as scientist that he left his tower long enough to share his knowledge for humanitarian purposes, he was considered to be beyond the pale, and no longer accepted by his colleagues behind the ivory walls. Dr. Oppenheimer recently presented the same thing in a slightly different manner in answer to Edward R. Murrow's question as to whether his recent experiences had made him afraid. "No", he answered, "neither I nor my colleagues are afraid of what criticism may do to us if we work for the

government. We are rather afraid of ceasing to be pure scientists, and of becoming applied scientists." This statement, I think, shows the real reason behind Dr. Barnes' critical review of Sorokin and Toynbee.

The same danger of which we are speaking also "threatened" in the field of science and invention in the form of a struggle between the scientist and the inventor.[5] According to Dr. James B. Conant, the scientist busily seeking out, recording nature's laws, and pointing out their relationships, has in the past looked upon the inventor as a sort of amateur meddler, or at least a highly pecuniary person, only useful through his "cook-book" empiricism in the profitable business of supplying ever more and more gadgets to the American housewife.

Now, although in the rapidly expanding economy of the West the inventor did seem to outstrip the pure scientist for a period, it was only a matter of time until the gap between them was narrowed until at present, while each is somewhat sceptical of the other, and both are considered a bit eccentric — but very necessary — by their financial and business patrons, they have at least learned that their best interests are served by joining forces. Often the two professions are combined in a single person or a group of persons working together in a complementary way. Thus the scientist by his continual search for basic relationships provides the principles by which the inventor ceases to be a rule of thumb worker, and idealistic dreamer, and becomes an accepted professional person in modern society. Nor does the inventor prove the only gainer, because, in his practical use of the laws provided for him, he is able to pass on to the public those scientific discoveries that might otherwise lie long unused.

Yet the fear concerning the place of religion and value systems in the social order has likewise been the cause of many lifted scientific eyebrows. By their very natures, at first sight there seems to be a great gap between philosophy and religion on the one hand and science on the other. Although the scientist always has looked askance at the religionist as a man of faith while he was a man of fact, he has forgotten that his whole scheme of work is also based on faith. Not faith in the recorded findings of his colleagues alone, but faith in the propositions, theories, hypotheses, etc., which are the functioning framework of science. Modern discoveries in the field of physical science have revealed that for decades the physicist has done a very creditable job in advancing his science by the use of hypotheses which today have been proved to be inaccurate, and in some cases definitely false. In fact, because of science now accepting the fact that it is not the repository of absolute knowledge, it has shown the way to a better understanding of religion and philosophy, so long considered vague in their own propositions.

This rather long digression into the area of science, religion and philosophy has been for the purpose of showing the similar situation that exists in regard to sociology as science. Since by its very nature and the subject matter of which it treats, there is less likelihood of its ever becoming amenable to the same rigid controls that govern the natural and physical sciences, and because of the great danger of allowing value judgements to imperil objective analysis, sociology has been denied a place in the gallery of scientific disciplines. Desperately trying to prove its worth, sociologists have made every attempt to extirpate all value judgements from their work, largely because they have felt that the holding of values and the understanding of objective truth are antagonistic to each other. However, Western thinkers in every field are now rather belatedly discovering that it is absolutely impossible to separate the two, if civilization is to preserved. The issue at stake is not to throw value judgements and value systems overboard, but to understand their real worth, and their proper place, and to use them in balanced relationship to the scientific data which are being used.

As a very important part of this problem, sociology is becoming aware of its own position in relation to the definition of science. Sociology does not seek, nor ever expects to become science as subject matter. In fact, contrary to popular opinion, no science is subject matter — test tubes, balances, Bunsen burners, elements, colored liquids in laboratory flasks. Science is method — not measurements of air pressure, nor analysis of chemical salts. Because science — which is method — has been applied to these things, men have learned what they are, what they do, and what they are good for in assisting humanity to achieve "that good life". Popularly we have made the mistake of making the things themselves as the content of subjects taught in the class room or sought in the laboratory to be science.

This could only come about because both those who looked upon science according to the first definition, and those who looked farther and included the second, were alike slow to grasp the fact that science is also activity, movement, a thing alive and in contact with the expanding needs of its human discoverers, and something which through misuse might come ultimately to rest in dusty tomes of forgotten libraries. Sociology likewise, in its earlier stages, both because its early leaders were not entirely clear in their own understanding of the discipline, and because the populace at large made the same mistake in regard to it as to the other scientific disciplines, has had a doubly hard road to travel. In the real sense however, *viz.*, that science is method and action, rather then mere subject matter, sociology is rapidly approaching the status of

a true science. With the greater perfection of measuring instruments wherewith to measure unpredictable man, and the discoveries in the realm of the "exact" physical and natural sciences which call for entirely new approaches, sociology is making bold to claim an *approaching* perfection of method *sufficient to meet the demands of a science in a specific field.*

No one will be so unthinkingly bold as to deny the dangers along the way — problems growing out of the very nature of the subject matter itself, man. There is reason to believe, however, that by establishing the proper relation between the pure science, sociology; and the applied science, an honest attempt to use the facts discovered for the alleviation of the ills of humanity leading to a fuller realization of the "good life"; and the developement of proper attitudes and research instruments, that basic hazards may eventually disappear or be overcome. The means used to accomplish this end comprise such techniques as professionalism, a much wider cooperation in interdisciplinary operations, and the developement of the scientific method as well as empirical observation and common sense applications. Unicausal explanations must be abandoned for the multicausational approach. Statistical methods and perfection of measuring instruments must be developed to a much greater degree than they have at present reached.

The progress of sociology toward perfection as a science is roughly divided into four distinct phases, *viz.*, folk sociology, historical sociology, welfare sociology, and sociology as a discipline. Although they are treated in this paper as categories, we should not lose sight of the fact that they are also historically related in time, with a progressive developement which is quite ably described in a growing body of literature under such headings as "The History of Social Thought", or "The Developement of Sociology".[7]

Folk sociology is sociology at the common sense, "grass roots" level. Its expression is usually in popularly understood terms, in the Koine of John Q. Public. As such it furnishes the grist to the editorial mills, and is the foundation of many a sermon, to say nothing of the "I point with pride, and view with alarm" presentations at the local college homecoming, the political rally, or the fourth of July American Legion patriotic celebration. It may often be skilled and competent, and, more often than we know, in the hands of able professors, folk sociology furnishes the subject matter for numerous discussions at the higher educational level in many groups, as well in the more scholarly presentations in professional journals. It becomes the basis for much of the content of so called social problems courses at the college level. In the form of

surveys, it quite largely furnishes the subject matter for studies as elementary as those often conducted on any college campus, and as pretentious as Llynd's *Middletown*, or Hollingshead's *Elmtown's Youth*.

Hard upon the heels of folk sociology is historical sociology. Just as one cannot understand music or philosophy apart from their history, neither can one understand sociology apart from its history. The history of sociology as record must of necessity be short, since many men now living have been students and colleagues of its founders — at least on the American scene. But long before sociology emerged as a discipline, men indulged in social thought. Certainly a history of sociology would include material as diverse as William Lyon Phelps' *Human Nature in the Bible* on the one hand, and Plato's *Republic* or More's *Utopia* on the other.

Since it is the primary object of history to record, sociology finds itself a bit handicapped in using it only in this capacity. Instead, history as used by the sociologist becomes the *basis* upon which to develope a social philosophy. Just as some have used history to prove a theory of a particular divine pattern, or evolutionary progression, or dialectical movement toward the super state; so also, the sociologist attempts to use the records of the historical past, together with the findings of the statistical present, as a means of forecasting a probable future. One negative force, however, is that often at this stage of developement what is intended as accurate forecasting of probability becomes, through human weakness or instrumental error, mere prophecy of things which do not come to pass. If sociology ever is able to attain success in this area, it will be because it has set its house in order to meet the demands of exactitude in prophetic and predictive ability, even as they were used to reveal the true prophet in Hebraic times.[8]

A third phase of modern sociological developement is in the area of welfare sociology. Remembering who its American founders were, it is not surprising to us to find such men as Charles A. Ellwood crusading for a positive program of amelioration as a definite part of sociological procedure. It is also easy to understand the fears of Dr. Barnes lest it deteriorate into a mere reform movement. Fear of this type of developement has been alleviated in recent years by the developement of a distinct School of Social Work. Although many of the leaders in the social work program have been trained as sociologists they have well understood the nature of their move into social work, and have themselves been the leaders in setting it up on a purely applied and utilitatian level, preserving the distinctions necessary to a clear discrimination between the two fields. An outgrowth of this has been the establishment of

many excellent schools of Social Work at the graduate level. Their curricula are heavily fretted with social problems courses which are practical and ethical in approach. A large body of utilitarian knowledge is gradually being built up. On a foundation of scientific, sociological knowledge and social theory, an attempt is made at the social work level to develope a body of rules and practices for dealing with individuals and families in distress.

As a discipline, sociology attempts the same meticulous treatment of subject matter and exacting requirements of personnel as any science. As subject matter, two aspects of social reality are carefully investigated, *viz.*, the area of personality developement and that of group life. Under personality developement every area having to do with the origin and growth of personality and human nature is investigated. Cultural and theoretical anthropology and social psychology fall under this heading. More specifically, in application to the problems of human behavior, there are attempts to answer the "why" of alcoholism, or as treated by Lindesmith, a search for the answers to the problem of narcotic addiction. Under the heading of group relations, we find a large number of specific course offerings such as social movement, criminology, ecology, family, marriage, public opinion and propaganda, etc. Combining the two areas, the sociologist attempts to describe social life — processes sufficiently accurately to predict in the scientific sense that, given certain facts and relations, other events may be foretold. After all, in the ability to predict lies the basis of control and to be able to control in the direction of the greatest good of humanity is both sociologically desirable and scientifically worthwhile.

FOOTNOTES

1 Bidney, David, *Theoretical Anthropology*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1953, Chapter 1.

2 Barnes, Harry Elmer, Book Review, *American Sociological Review*, August, 1948, p. 492.

3 Hinckle, Roscoe and Gisela Hinckle, *The Developement of Modern Sociology: Its Nature and Growth in the United States*, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1954, Chapter 1.

4 White, Morton, *Social Thought in America, The Revolt Against Formalism*. New York, Viking Press, 1949.

5 Conant, James B., *Modern Science for Modern Man*, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1953, Chapters 2 and 4.

6 Lundberg, George A., *Social Research, A Study in Methods of Gathering Data*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1942. Introduction and Chap. 1.

7 Reuter, *Sociology*, Part 1.

8 Deuteronomy 18: 20-22.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ellwood, Chas. A., *The Reconstruction of Religion; a Sociological View*, New York, Macmillan and Co., 1922.

———————, *Christianity and Social Science: a Challenge to the Church*, New York, Macmillan, 1923.

Hollingshead, August, *Elmtown's Youth*, New York, J. Wiley, 1949.

Lindesmith, Alfred Ray, *Opiate Addiction*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1947.

Lynd, Robert S., and Helen Merril Lynd, *Middletown*, New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1929 and 1936 (revision).

Phelps, William Lyon, *Human Nature in the Bible*, 1922.

Toynbee, Arnold J., *Civilization on Trial*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1948.

Sorokin, Pitirim A., *Reconstruction of Humanity*, Boston, The Beacon Press, 1948.

LANGUAGE AND THEOLOGY: SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

Richard K. Curtis

At the recent Geneva Conference, President Eisenhower concluded his last speech, "We did not come here to reach final solutions." Russia's Nikolai Bulganin summarized, "We got to know each other better." And even though much was left undone, the world breathed easier. Even we Fundamentalists, skeptical as we are of lasting peace, in view of the "clear teaching" of Matthew 24, breathed easier. For, inherently, we suspect those who refuse to get together of trying to aggravate conflict, but hold out hope for those who seek at least "to know each other better." Maybe that's one reason we put up with the U.N.

As a matter of fact the world at large places far more faith, of course, in the U.N. than in theology. Or perhaps it isn't theology after all, but theologians that the world distrusts. Perhaps they are merely like the varying camps of theologians who, while professing Christ's love for all men, exclude from the "all" the "apostates" and "heretics" who dare disagree with them. When we estimate our likenesses greater than our differences we'll meet under the same tent where, if not to "reach final conclusions" we do get "to know each other better." If, for example, at a given moment I have a disagreement with my neighbor, and refuse to talk to him, I will soon relent (and, I trust, so will he) if either of our houses begin to burn. In that case the likenesses (including a like fear that both our houses will burn) take on supreme importance and we're not the least surprised that suddenly we can work together smoothly.

Is it exaggeration to liken this to the present theological situation? *It is the purpose of this paper not only to urge a more serious estimate of the likenesses, or areas of agreement among Christian theologians, but also to show that some of the differences may be, after all, only differences of language.*

Theology studies the things of God in order to integrate and classify them systematically, i.e. to help make God coherent to us. But underlying even this purpose there should be the ultimate purpose of producing Christlikeness. For if, according to John, in Heaven "we shall be like Him for we shall see Him as He is," then one means of Christlikeness here on earth is to see Him as distinctly as possible. If the first purpose is intellectual, the second is practical, and without the latter the former becomes sterile. If we tend to pride ourselves as Fundamentalists that the theological swing during the last decade has been toward our camp, let us be properly humbled by the possibility that a Second World War and subsequent jitters had far more to do with knocking the props out from under all but the most diehard of the postmillennial liberals than our own professed Christlikeness. And need we remind ourselves that an inferiority complex is not nearly as dangerous as the pride that shuns self-correction, which is implicit in the "I told you so" attitude.

This very tendency, to divorce thinking from action and theory from practice, is one of the many assumptions that have sprung from Aristotelian logic and that continue a dubious blessing to man's thinking, and especially theological thinking, even today.

Now this first assumption (or unconscious habit), that of divorcing knowing from doing, stems from the fact that "know-why" problems were left to Aristotle and other professional thinkers of his day known as philosophers. On the other hand, the "know-how" was relegated to the artists, craftsmen and slaves. Thus it remained until the Renaissance, with its birth of the scientific age, began to force a union of the two. Such a union has never been completed, however. Witness the battle that continues between the arts and sciences in our educational institutions, between the white and blue collar workers in industry, and between the clergy and laity. The sociologists label it "cultural lag" and lay there the blame for today's neuroses, saying that we are trying to organize an atomic, supersonic world on the basis of horse-and-buggy philosophies and institutions. Contemporary Christian theologians begin to apply themselves far more rigorously to the ethical import of their study, first to find out why we are being stymied in so many areas in producing a far more Christlike Fundamentalism, and second, to find why we fail to reach the intellectuals and leaders of our society.

More serious perhaps than the divorce of knowledge and action is the heritage of Aristotle in the form of a cleancut system of logic by which we are supposed to govern our language and thought. It started out to be an intellectual parlor game, a yes-and-no game that introduced an unnatural way of thinking from unwarranted assumptions to foregone conclusions. Today it has so thoroughly permeated Western thought and language that no area has escaped. Indeed it occupies an imposing place in the ivory towers of most colleges and universities.

Let us examine, first, Aristotle's method of definition, or classification of knowledge, since this has proven the source of unwarranted assumptions. According to this, in order to know something, you must define it, and in order to define it you must classify it by similarities (genus) and differentia (species). Thus man, according to *Webster's New International Dictionary*, is anthropologically an individual of the genus homo, but is also the highest type of animal existing or known to have existed, particularly because of his extraordinary mental development, etc. The idea is that once we can verbalize the classification of man into genus and species, once we can *define* man, we know him. Actually what we're doing is substituting a small segment of verbalization for experiential knowledge. The result: in our educational system an appetite for experiential knowledge is channelled into an appetite for names.[1] Surely there is something more to be said than that something belongs or does not belong to a given class. Propositions and definitions, parts of formal knowledge, must be severely strained to include practical everyday situations of question, answer, and command.[2]

Furthermore, classification assumes we are in a position to perceive not only likenesses and differences, but *essential* likenesses and differences. We may not have much trouble with the old saw, "All men are mortal," but we might experience more difficulty with "All tomatoes are vegetables" (such as the higher courts of law did when they contradicted each other recently; the lower court's verdict of "fruit" being reversed by the higher court). We really begin to swim when we make not just simple judgments, but value-judgments. "The works of Poe ('all' is implicit) are magnificent" may sound all right to a lover of mystery yarns, but can evoke strong argument from a lover of realistic biography. To sink instead of swim, all we have to do is climb a few rungs on the ladder of abstraction and begin to talk about liberty, democracy, Communism, bureaucracy, Arminianism, predestination, supra-lapsarianism, salvation, etc.

It's a long way from "all men are mortal" to "all Fundamentalists are thoroughgoing Calvinists" or "all Socialists are Communists" but I

leave it to you which type of statement more represents everyday judgments. We assume we see things *as they are*, even as Aristotle assumed qualities and essence to be inherent in objects themselves. In reality, no two people see anything alike in every respect. That a multitude of variables determines just what we do see has been borne out by numerous experiments and can easily be demonstrated by even a cursory investigation of the nature of perception.

Just what does happen when we *see* something? Physiology and psychology have both contributed some valuable information, based upon experimental research. If I have just received my sight, having been born blind, I "see" nothing at first but a confusion of spinning colors. If, however, I have normal vision, I am able, for example, to focus on this particular swivel chair in front of the window in my office. In so doing, I am abstracting the chair from its environmental context. I am saying implicitly that the rest of the office isn't important at the moment, even though such context will influence my perception of the chair. In the process of focusing, or abstracting, therefore, an implied judgment is exercised (this chair is all-important while the rest is not). Light waves, radiating on the submicroscopic level, impinge upon the retina of the eye. There they stimulate nerve endings and impulses travel along the nerve fibers to the brain.

Now the job of decoding begins. If I had never seen a chair before, or could not *remember* that I had seen one before (and had I lived before Columbus' day the chances are I would not, since the movable one-person seat with legs and a back wasn't conceived until 1490) then the job of "seeing" would be a rather confusing one of integrating this chair into a pattern of experience devoid of close resemblance.[3] But supposing I've seen chairs before, but no *swivel* chairs. Then, obviously, I will "see" this chair as a different entity than I actually would out of an experience of many chairs of different styles in different circumstanes (lifting them, standing on them, repairing them, buying them, and enjoying many other experiences of them other than that of merely sitting). Instead of a blur of spinning colors, I am *seeing* a chair (decoding it through a pattern of experiences based on the memory of previous experiences of a similar nature).

Thus the pattern (or the lenses through which we look at the world) is itself based upon the subjective judgment of previous abstracting in addition to a memory that is far from reliable. Experiments indicate we not only forget 90 per cent of what we "see" but, further, what we do remember tends to be not what they *were* but what they *should have been*.[4]

Asked to describe the swivel chair in my office, I would ordinarily say it is constructed of wood, excluding the steel casters upon which it rolls and the gadget for teetering backwards, with arms on either side continuing from the back, itself rounded and stabilized by a series of vertical sticks. Furthermore, it is hard, of a well-polished, walnut brown finish, weighing about twenty-five pounds and standing about three feet in height. Note that the elements in this description are not inherent in the *chair* but in *me*. Brownness and hardness are derived from my pattern of experience through which I see and evaluate this chair. Furthermore, this chair today is not this chair tomorrow. A new location, a few more scratches, another layer of dust, and new finish, all point to the fact that the world is in a constant state of flux.[5]

Aristotle's trouble, then, was mainly twofold: that of objectifying qualities as distinct from the observer and inherent in objects, and that of failing to note process. As theologians, when we designate a man a "conservative," we must recognize first that we are not denoting him as much as we are ourselves, i.e. the label denotes the relationship we have established between ourselves and him, depending on where *we* stand on the continum ranging from hyperconservative to hyperliberal. Secondly, we must recognize that the label, "conservative", applies to that relationship in one given moment of time. If we, as the labeler, and/or he as the labeled, change our positions on the continuum, the relationship which the label designates is then altered. Thus conservative, August 15, 1955 may differ radically from the relationship established on the continuum a year hence.[6]

If these, then, are the major weaknesses of Aristotle's system of classification, upon which his premises (as well as dictionary definitions since that day) are based, what of the syllogistic reasoning (equated by philosophers and others since his day with *correct* thinking) by which he proceeded from unwarranted assumptions to foregone conclusions? If we distinguish truth from validity in that the former implies adequate correspondence between referent and symbol (between chair as object and chair as word) while the latter implies conformity to a set of arbitrary rules governing the use of symbols (proceeding from symbol to symbol rather than from referent to symbol), we must ask if Aristotle's set of rules is more pertinent today than was his system of classification and arriving at premises or propositions.

His first rule was the law of identification, A is A. Let us first ask what he meant by "is." It was by means of this two-letter word that Aristotle postulated qualities as existing within objects themselves. As soon as he could link objects with their characteristics (e.g. man is con-

ceived by woman, learns to walk on two legs, talks, thinks, pays taxes, and dies — based on Aristotle's experience of man, including himself) then he could classify those objects. Note that the process involved noun-to-verb (man walks on two legs), then noun to adjective (man is two-legged), then noun to noun (man is a biped). Now as a tool of thought this simple formula "A is A" is fraught with danger. In the first place we get to think of qualities as residing within objects, such qualities as hardness, warmness, piety, which are (or should be) apparent to all. If we don't "see" them, all we have to do is change our position until "they" become apparent. If the other fellow doesn't "see" them, he is obviously "wrong" (in the wrong position to "see" them.) Equally as dangerous is the temptation to confuse the symbol (e.g. "radical") with the referent (relationship between the labeler and the labeled) so that we react to the symbol rather than that for which it stands.

Since Aristotle conceived of qualities as inherently resident within objects, he felt he could draw strict fences around his classifications, put the "is" inside and relegate all else to "is not." From here it was an easy jump to the law of excluded middle, either it is or it is not. Now to believe that plants and animals fall into certain, precise, fixed and unchanging categories leads to a worship of formal definitions as a substitute for true learning (experiential knowledge). And, to carry the method one step further, substituting value judgments, is to tread on very dangerous ground indeed.

If, for example, I were to sit in on a meeting of a theological society and hear a man speak of the Bible as "containing" the Word of God, I might well react in the following manner. Armed with the pattern of experience which has linked neo-orthodox theologians with Biblical relativists, I evaluate the speaker accordingly. This man is obviously a Biblical relativist (a precise, fixed, unchanging category). Therefore, this man is a pseudo-theologian from the standpoint of *the true* theology, and one whom I must battle with all my might lest he undermine the very foundation of my faith — here emotion helps color the issue so that any further progress toward understanding and learning in this particular meeting is completely stymied).

It is this simple, two-valued orientation which arises from the law of excluded middle that proves such a pitfall in every field of endeavor. If I am an historian I either follow Frederick Jackson Turner or I don't. If I am a psychologist I'm either an environmentalist or an hereditarian, a behaviorist or a holist. If I'm a philosopher I must either be an Aristotelian or a non-Aristotelian. All is black or white, good or bad, sinful or pious, sacred or vulgar. It is into these nice, neat categories that our

lazy minds would lead us, until we realize that with most of our value judgments there is a continuum of gray between the black at one extreme and the white at the other. Most phenomena must be analyzed as a spectrum in which red *proceeds* into orange with no discernible steps. Here we purposely use "most" in regard to value judgments, for we do recognize that there are some judgments requiring the either/or classification, (e.g. Christians or non-Christians, heaven or hell, life or death, etc.)

It is at this point that we come to the crux of the matter. Having examined to some degree the manner of perceiving *objects*, let us now ask a question that is apt to be far more involved — what do we "see" when we focus our attention upon words? Suppose, for example, I focus upon the shortest verse in the Bible, Luke 11:35 "And Jesus wept." What, actually, do I "see"? Granting at the outset that I am in substantial possession of my senses, that I will see more than a blur of spinning light, that I can distinguish one letter from another and arrange them into meaningful discourse, that I am a Christian in full possession of the gift of salvation, and therefore possessed *by* the Author of the Word, the Holy Spirit, just what do I "see"?

Light waves proceed from the part of the page not inked, impinging on the nerve endings in the retinas of my eyes. Impulses proceed to the brain where previously connected nerves have formed a pattern of experience which serves to decode the impulses. Instead of a referent itself however (an object: a chair) the brain perceives a group of outlined symbols used by somebody to stand for a referent or, as we shall see in this case, a referent of a referent.

Past experience classifies these symbols as three words, all of which I have seen before but not in this contextual order. These words, as such, constitute a part of a given language. And "every living language", according to the seventeenth century English linguist Bentley, is "like the perspiring bodies of living creatures, in perpetual motion and lateration."[7] It can exist only as used by people in a community willing to share the same conventional symbols to represent certain (yet changing) referents. Words are added, others dropped, still more change the number and/or nature of the referents symbolized. As soon as the demand for a new word appears, a new label will be forthcoming. As soon as the referent is no longer experienced, the word becomes obsolete. As soon as the word takes in new referents it becomes ever more usable (and difficult to understand).[8] For we speak and write as we *do*.[9] The essential difference between the language and the doing or experiencing, is that the former "separates out from the living matrix little bundles and freezes them."[10]

In addition to the problem of a constantly changing medium of communication, independent and arbitrary as it is in standing for conventionalized areas of referents, we face a further problem inherent in the metaphysical structure of language. Leo Spitzer has pointed out that all languages offer their speakers and interpreters a ready-made interpretation of the world, a *Weltanschuauung* or metaphysical word picture, which, after having originated in the thinking of our ancestors, tends to impose itself ever anew on posterity.

For example, where the Indo-European arranges it "I see him," thereby emphasizing free will, the Eskimo, a fatalist, phrases it, "he appears to me."[11] The Indo-European tongues, in following the subject-predicate form, imply a causal relationship which is inseparably linked with time. And whereas time was considered an absolute through the period of Newtonian physics, modern physics with its emphasis on relativity has increasingly linked time and space as but different interpretations of essentially the same phenomenon. Thus, the Western scientist has had to abandon the spoken tongue and take to the special language of calculus. A study of the language problem of the U.N. will verify this. The Chinese, for example, dissect nature and the universe very differently from the West, with a profound effect on the systems of belief.[12]

This metaphysical structure of language becomes a particularly throny problem when we encounter our next subject, translation. In the first place, note that the words, "And Jesus wept," are not merely symbols of other symbols of other symbols of other symbols (just how far removed from the referent is impossible to determine, since we have no extant original manuscripts of the Scriptures, and therefore no certain way of knowing just *what* the original symbols were, much less the referent). Further, note that English, an Indo-European tongue using the subject-predicate language peculiarity of structure, while similar to the Greek, is not even of the same *branch* of languages (Semito-Hamitic) as was the language of the Old Testament, Hebrew.[13] So in addition to the translation problem of finding equivalent words in two languages (the exception rather than the rule), and especially of translating idioms, there is imposed the distinct problem of translating from one metaphysical language structure into another.[14] And foreign language students will corroborate the observation of Schopenhauer that "in learning any foreign language you form new concepts, discover new relationships you didn't realize before, innumerable nuances, similarities, and differences enter your mind. You get a rounded view of everything."[15]

Now just what does the verse "And Jesus wept" mean? Of this we can be somewhat certain. It *means* a group of conventionalized symbols,

by which a seventeenth century Englishman, looking through his own pattern of experience and forced to write in a language structure containing an implied metaphysics, attempted to translate what he considered to be the meaning of a group of symbols in another language, which in turn were subject to the same translation problems, and which in turn represented a set of symbols in still another language, which, perhaps, by this time represented the oldest extant manuscript or group of manuscripts in which the verse is found. But we still do not have the original symbols (manuscripts) much less the original referents, so the best we can do is to say with a high degree of probability (and a remarkably high degree, considering the multiplicity of variables that we have encountered) we have before us in "And Jesus wept" somewhat the same symbols as would have appeared on the original manuscript from the standpoint of their correspondence to the referent (the real, historic Jesus, weeping).

If, then, we can conclude that the Scriptures in our pssesssion are, at best, accurate representations *to a high degree of probability* (and not *absolute* as some have stoutly maintained, and others have unconsciously assumed, even though even a cursory look at the evidence would have quickly disproved it), then perhaps we are in a position to ask the question, "What do they mean?" In my explanation I am obliged to do a number of things. First, I must realize that the questioner is asking me to *share my experience* with him. But this I cannot do unless I realize just who is my questioner. If he is my four year old son, I will explain it (give its meaning) in words far different from those I would use before a theological society. Second, I will be obliged to use a language other than that in which it was originally written. Third, since I have no original manuscript, I will be obliged to depend on the accuracy of copiests (men like myself who see symbols through the metaphysical structure of their own language, as well as the complex environmental context in which they lived). Fourth, I am forced to look through the lenses of my own changing patterns of experience, and use a language structure that emphasizes the free will of man. Fifth, I have never seen Jesus, much less Jesus weeping, for I can never reconstruct the original referent; therefore, I am dependent on the pictures of Sallman and other painters who have tried to depict Jesus on their easels. Sixth, the words of the verse evoke in me profound emotional feeling, for I have both wept and seen others weep, and this emotion will tend to color my choice of words, depending not only upon my mental picture of Jesus, and my reaction to weeping as such, but also upon the two in context. In the seventh place, I would have to study the arbitrary, artificial abstracting of this verse from its context, without which no meaning could be pro-

perly interpreted; but, since the immediate Biblical context must in turn be interpreted in terms of an ever-expanding context (Jesus weeping — Lazarus, his sisters *et al.* — Jesus' ministry up to and including, as well as following that particular event, which in turn must be set in its larger context for proper perspective — *ad infinitum*) there is no chance that I could ever give *the* final word on what this simple verse means (nor could anybody else this side of Heaven).

And finally, having given my explanation of what I considered the meaning to be through my pattern of experience as formed to date, I am not at all certain that my words will be correctly interpreted by my questioner as representing the true referent (a relationship of myself to the questioner, to the occasion, to the Bible, to the Jesus it mentions, and to a multitude of other factors too complex and numerous to enumerate). Indeed, it is tribute to the Holy Spirit Himself (whom we take mainly by faith rather than by reason) that theologians today are able to communicate at all on the exceedingly complex and abstract level that they do.

In this paper the writer has attempted to point out some basic considerations which he hopes may lead to a clearer understanding of the relationship between theology and language. *To summarize*:

1. The present crisis points up the fact that contemporary conservative theologians are not meeting the needs of the world at large, much less their leaders.

2. This is in part due to a failure to utilize the mass media of communication, in part due to the failure to utilize what media we do use *effectively*, and in part due to the suspicion which the lay world has of so many varying camps of theologians, with different tents within their camps, and their tendency to look at other tents and camps with varying degrees of emotion ranging from downright hostility to Pharisaic smugness.

3. It is at least possible that some of these differences that separate theologians may be due to semantic rather than theological problems (have you ever noticed how much more smoothly a discussion proceeds when the participants are agreed on at least what the symbols are postulated to represent?).

4. The field of theology is most difficult to discuss, both because of the emotional connotation of the words and the high degree of abstraction and consequent lack of invariants. This situation means less common ground of understanding so necessary for communication.

5. We have inherited from Aristotelian logic several assumptions which have less and less meaning in an increasingly scientifically oriented society. These assumptions include:

a. The divorce of thinking from action. This continues today to cloud the thinking of clergymen as well as educators facing everyday problems of practical reality.

b. The worship of formal definitions (Aristotelian classifications) by which we tend to substitute verbalization for experience, and set up propositions or major premises not on the basis of their correspondence to actual referents (truth), but only as springboards into a game for determining validity among words (according to one way of thinking.) Aside from the "gobbledygook" of sixty-four dollar words that overwhelm the average reader of theology, theologians are prone to pseudo-definitions and pseudo-propositions. For example, if one were to ask "Can God sin?" the tendency would be to answer, "No, for God is holy." The reasoning is "God cannot sin because He is holy." Or, "God cannot sin because He cannot sin," since an accepted definition of God's holiness *is* His inability to sin.

c. The law of identity, (A is A) presupposes that distinguishing qualities are resident *within* objects themselves, rather than within the observer.

d. The law of contradiction, (A is not non-A) presupposes that these inherent qualities make rigid classifications possible, in which objects (including men) can be arranged either within or without the fence.

e. The law of excluded middle (X is either A or non-A) by which all things could be simply conceived in a bi-polar relationship, when actually there may be a great latitude between opposite poles. Failure to apply the spectrum analysis may make us potential demagogues, but hardly conscientious Christians. Here the author has not begun to deal with the practical problem of persuasion which is all but impossible without recourse to such over-simplifications as "loaded" words, slogans, brand-names, trademarks, etc. As a matter of fact, a sober, humble presentation of facts in as accurate language as possible — inevitably filled with 'ehring' and 'ahing', with perhapses and maybes — is usually completely boring, if not ridiculous.

6. To label the Scriptures *as we have them* as the *Absolute* Word of God is to hold a position completely untenable in view of but a cursory examination of the evidence. The most we can truthfully say is that our present translations represent the original revelation (which we believe *by faith* to have come from God) to a high degree of probability (such degree varying with the translation-interpreter relationship). Here the reader will do well to consult the book review by H. Wade Seaford, Jr.

(*Gordon Review*, May, 1955, p. 74.) in which he quotes Eugene Nida in his *Customs and Cultures: Anthropology for Christian Missions*, p. 282:

> The only absolute in Christianity is the triune God. Anything which involves man, who is finite and limited, must of necessity be limited, and hence relative. Biblical relativism is an obligatory feature of our incarnational religion, for without it we would either absolutize human institutions or relativize God.

Now while some will admit words to be relative, they will maintain concepts as being absolute; yet, aside from the psychological evidence showing that we think in words some, if not all, of the time, the author finds it most difficult to discuss such concepts without recourse to an admittedly relative medium. In such case, any argument from the absolute conceptionalists must remain an argument from silence, a poor argument indeed. Again, to maintain we cannot live our lives without *absolute, authoritarian dogma* is to belie the actual lives which all of us live, in which we think, speak, and act on a basis ranging all the way from guesswork, to highest probability.

In conclusion, the author hopes that this article will be regarded as a springboard for future discussion, rather than a definitive last word (which it neither is nor could be). What we consider a revolution of all thinking tends to become for our children matter-of-fact school knowledge, acquired as a part of their complex environment to be believed and proclaimed with all of the dogmatism of everyday experience. Thus, possible criticism to which even our greatest discoveries should be continually submitted, is easily forgotten. Thus, too, we lose sight of the limitations of even our deepest insights. So, we forget, in our absorbing concern with the particulars, to re-examine the foundations of our whole structure of knowledge. Consequently, we stagnate and fall short of the goal for which we have been created, that of being "perfected in His image day by day."

FOOTNOTES

1 Rapaport, Anatol, *Operational Philosophy*, 1954, Harper and Bros., p. 18.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 41.
3 Giedion, Siegfried, *Mechanization Takes Command*, p. 268.
4 Bartlett, F. C., *Remembering*, quoted in Flesch, Rudolph, *Art of Clear Thinking*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1951, p. 21. See also Kelley, Earl C., *Education for What is Real*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1947.
5 Miller, George A., *Language and Communication*, New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1951, pp. 177ff.
6 Cf. *Ibid.*, Ch. 9, "Verbal Habits."

[7] Boas, *et al.*, *Studies in Intellectual History*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1953, p. 76.

[8] A quick check of Webster's unabridged dictionary will show the word "run" to maintain reference to no less than sixty-eight different referents (*actually* areas of referents).

[9] Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 193. See Chase, Stuart, *Power of Words*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951, p. 131.

[10] Bridgman, P. W., *The Nature of Physical Theory*, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1936, p. 24.

[11] Boas, *op. cit.*, p. 83. See Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 199, 200; Entwistle, Wm. J., *Aspects of Language*, London: Faber and Faber, 1953, pp. 6, 7; and Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 101, quoting Benjamin Lee Whorf.

[12] Chase, *op. cit.*, p. 103. See Flesch, *op. cit.*, p. 35; and Rapaport, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[13] Pei, Mano, *The Story of Language*, New York: J. P. Lippincott, 1949, p. 30.

[14] Knox, Ronald, *Bible Translation: The Trials of a Translator*, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1949.

[15] Flesch, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

PERSONALIA

Wilbur L. Bullock is Associate Professor of Zoology at the University of New Hampshire. Dr. Bullock received his B.S. in biology from Queens college in New York. The M.S. and Ph.D. in zoology were conferred upon him by the University of Illinois. His teaching has been in the fields of general biology, histology, parasitology, and marine invertebrate zoology. Special research has been carried on in parasitology. In connection with this study Professor Bullock has published a number of articles.

For the coming academic year he is a postdoctoral research fellow in biology at The Rice Institute in Texas. Dr. Bullock is a member of the following learned societies: Phi Sigma, Sigma Xi, The Society of Systematic Zoologists, The American Society of Parasitologists, and The American Scientific Affiliation.

Carmen C. Decker is Professor of Sociology at Sterling College, Sterling, Kansas. He received his Th.B., A.M. in Th., and A.B. from Marion College, Indiana. The thesis for the A.M. at Marion was entit'ed, "Inscriptions, Papyri and Ostraca: Interpreters and Confirmers of the New Testament." This was later published as a monograph in popular form, especially for use in youth organizations, under the title, *This is the Word of God.*

During the two decades between World Wars, his time was about equally divided between pastoral work in the United States and mission-

ary work in West Africa. In 1942 he enlisted in the Army of the United States as a chaplain, serving for almost three years in transport duty in the Pacific area.

Upon release from active duty, he pursued graduate study at Indiana University in sociology and philosophy. The M.A. in sociology was received from that institution (Thesis: "The Correlation between Economic Status and Eschatological Belief in two Methodist Churches in Bloomington, Indiana").

Professor Decker taught at Taylor University for four years; then, he taught for one year at Jackson College, Honolulu, T.H., at the same time taking work as a special student at the University of Hawaii in the field of Hawaiian culture and race relations. Returning from Hawaii, he assumed his present affiliation with Sterling College.

He is a member of The American Sociological Society, The Midwest Sociological Society, The National Council on Family Relations, The Society for the Study of Social Problems, American Association of College Professors, and the Military Chaplains Association of the United States.

One son has completed his missionary training and with his wife and children is on his way to Congo where Professor Decker's daughter and husband are in charge of a Methodist hospital.

Richard K. Curtis is Director of the Department of Communications at Providence-Barrington Bible College in Rhode Island. Dr. Curtis received his Th.B. from Northern Baptist Theological Seminary. The M.S. and Ph.D. were obtained at Purdue University. His doctoral dissertation dealt with the pulpit speaking of Dwight L. Moody. Professor Curtis is a member of The Speech Association of America, The New England Speech Association, and The National Council of Teachers of English.

This journal is not an official publication of Gordon College or Gordon Divinity School. It is rather an independent effort spontaneously undertaken by the persons whose names are listed as comprising the official staff of the publication. The School and editorial staff take no responsibility for the individual opinions expressed here.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

J. Gresham Machen: A Biographical Memoir, by Ned B. Stonehouse. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1954. 520pp. $5.95.

This important volume has already been reviewed widely. The addition of another review perhaps seems unnecessary or even out of place at this late date. Such might be the case were this a review only in the strict use of the term. However, it is not: it is more of the nature of an impression or bit of personal reflection.

For the reviewer, J. Gresham Machen is a very important person and scholar for very important personal reasons. A few years after the writer's entrance into the articulate Christian life, he became extremely depressed by the paucity of sane and up-to-date Christian scholarship. Upon the suggestion of a friend, he began reading Machen's various writings. As with almost everyone who has taken them up, he was amazed and pleased with their clarity, depth, and power. For him the introduction to Machen was an introduction to a new dimension of Christian doctrine and experience.

Thus, when the present volume appeared, he was consumed with eagerness to savor every bit of it. There was no disappointment. It proved to be a most worthy chronicle of the life and works of this great-hearted servant of the Most High. The early chapters on Machen's family background on both sides and his own youth and pre-college training succeed admirably in conveying to the reader an appreciation of those elements which, in the providence of God, went to make this unusual man. Again and again the reader who is familiar, even in a cursory way, with Machen's life and writings must comment, "I knew that something like this would have been part of his background."

The latter is also particularly applicable to the record of Machen's European study and his consequent struggle in his own heart to keep the faith as truth. It hardly seems that anyone who had not known, and risen victorious out of, such a soul-crushing battle could have shown the breadth of spirit and scrupulous fairness to opposing views that he always manifested. A somewhat similar lesson and bit of inspiration for the earnest seeker of God's will today is found in Machen's effort to ascertain whether or not he should present himself for ordination. This too indicates what may have been the fundamental characteristic of his person and life — a deep and *intelligent* determination to do only what is right.

The reader will find that the narrative, though quite detailed, moves rapidly and fascinatingly through every phase of Machen's career. There is also a real bonus in this study. It is not only a personal, Christian history but also as much a document for our times since it searches the historical foundations of contemporary, theological scholarship and ecclesiastical practice.

There are, of course, some things one could wish for in addition to what has been presented. This reviewer, in an extended conversation with Dr. Stonehouse, shared some such thoughts. He was, however, in candor bound to admit, then as now, that an author cannot be expected to do everything in one book. On the other hand, it would be appreciated if in some future publication greater attention might be paid to an examination of Machen's ability to judge persons (as contrasted with issues) and also to his rigid determination to carry through a course of action once he had set his mind to it.

One cannot help but feel that had Machen been more tractable as regards his personal activities, he might have accepted good counsel, avoided over-taxing himself, and have been with us today. And, what a privilege it would be for us who have known him through his writings to know him personally and as a still valiant champion, in our day of theological and world crisis, of the "faith once delivered to the saints."

—Lloyd F. Dean

Revelation Twenty, an Exposition, by J. Marcellus Kik. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1955. 92pp. $2.00.

This is a verse by verse exposition of the twentieth chapter of Revelation written in a clear, interesting style that invites and instructs the Christian layman. While it is not a grammatical exegesis written for the scholar, the author gives evidence of a thorough acquaintance with the best in exegesis. Inevitably such a chapter as this will not find all of its interpreters agreed. In general, Pastor Kik's position might be described as post-millennial, though most amillennialists would agree with him. Throughout the book there is manifested a devotion to the Word and an absence of controversial feeling which commends the book to all who love the Word, regardless of their millennial position. The book is a welcome addition to the library of Biblical interpretation.

The weakness of such a book is inherent in its very nature. One cannot abstract even so critical a chapter as this from the body of Scripture and hope to settle much of a doctrinal nature. The millennial

position, as a part of the whole doctrine of eschatalogy, is not based upon the Olivet Discourse or on Revelation twenty alone. It is based upon interpretations and principles of interpretation validated by their application through the Old and New Testaments. While Revelation is an important part of the doctrine, neither the whole book nor certainly one chapter can by itself solve many millennial problems. As an exposition, *Revelation Twenty* is a welcome Bible study. As an attempt at solving the millennial problem, it may be hoped that this is just one chapter of many to follow.

—*Philip C. Johnson*

Relative Chronologies in Old World Archeology, edited by Robert W. Ehrich. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. xiii 154pp. Illustrated. $2.50.

This volume is composed of papers presented at the fifty-first annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Philadelphia on December 30, 1952. They were delivered as a symposium which was an attempt to coordinate the chronologies of the various areas of the Ancient World. There is no attempt to arrive at fixed dates and an absolute chronology, an impossibility at the present time due to wide differences and disagreements both within and among the various cultures. A comparison of cultural data, however, may lead to a comparative chronology which, where any absolute dating is possible, it will affect not one but all the regions studied. Each area was represented by a recognized specialist in the field: Egypt — Helene J. Kanter; Palestine — W. F. Albright; Syria — Robert J. Braidwood; Mesopotamia — Ann Perkins; Iran — Donald E. McCown; southeastern Anatolia — Hetty Goldman; the Aegean — Saul S. Weinberg; southeastern and central Europe — Robert W. Ehrich, the editor; and China — Lauriston Ward. The addition of China to this comparative study is an unusual and intriguing innovation. Dr. Ward's opening paragraph opens up wide possibilities when he states, "Thanks to the archeological work of recent years, it is impossible to escape the conviction that China, in spite of its remote position, has always been in more or less intimate, though indirect, contact with the West . . ."

Since the papers were restricted to one half hour and have been further condensed by the editor, the material is largely summary and suggestion. It is very clear that much has yet to be done in determining the criteria to be used in determining comparisons, indeed in determining just what the term "culture" means. The book is highly technical, but

the student of archeology, anthropology and ancient history will find much of exceeding value and interest. There are a number of plates and diagrams illustrating the material, and most of the articles have full bibliographies.

—Philip C. Johnson

A Christian Approach to Philosophy, by WARREN C. YOUNG. Wheaton, Ill.: Van Kampen Press, 1954. 252 pp. $4.00.

This volume by Dr. Young is intended to fill a pressing need in Christian educational circles, for "the main purpose of this book is to provide an introduction to philosophy for evangelical Christian colleges" (10). There has been a growing conviction of the value of philosophical study by Christian students and this work is presented as a beginning text for such study. Different chapters are devoted to such philosophical areas as methodology, epistemology, cosmology, anthropology, psychology, axiology, and theology.

Young seems to offer his definition of philosophy in the first chapter as "the attempt to provide an integrated world-view" (22), but later he orients himself in terms of Biblical Christianity and states that "Christian philosophy, taken as a whole, is that system of thought (or world-view) which results from man's thinking under the influence of the Spirit which God has given, which recognizes as authoritative the Word He has spoken, and which places, at its very center, Christ, the Word Who became flesh" (202).

Instructors will find this to be a most helpful text for beginning classes, though considerable collateral reading will be necessary in order to gain more depth of insight into the different philosophical problems. The chapter on epistemology is especially scanty and has almost no orientation to a specifically Christian philosophy.

There are three topics of discussion in this text which might be unduly confusing to the philosophical tyro. These may have been cast as they are due to the necessary limitation of the individual problems in order to attain a wider scope of perspective, but, as they stand, they must be judged inadequate. They are as follows.

1. *The Division of World-views.* Young divides philosophical world-views into three groups: naturalism, idealism, and Christian realism. This is a rather questionable procedure for it excludes the possibility of a Biblical idealism — which exclusion many Christian philosophers would

challenge. More important, however, is the 'confusilation' (cf. *Progressive Calvinism*, 1 (1955) 177) arising out of the use of the term 'realist' to denote exclusively Christian philosophy. The student will rarely find it as such in philosophical literature without careful modification. Contemporary non-Christian realism may well be reducible to Young's definition of naturalism, but it is, for weal or woe, generally called realism.

2. *The Doctrine of coherence.* Young is obviously an opponent of coherence as the test for truth but often confusedly and for reasons not too convincing. He argues for the right to basic assumptions and then criticizes coherence because of its inability to validate these assumptions (56). He indicates that coherence is questionable as a method because it does not include presuppositions (37) and also is weak because it does (56)! Dr. Young admits that coherence is a common methodological test of all philosophical world-views (36-37) and, hence (he assumes), it is factored out as a significant test of truth, since all philosophers suppose their views to be coherent.

Now, it is debatable whether all do make this supposition. Perhaps a distinction between psychological and logical coherence is necessary here. Later, however, Young maintains that not only is it "the aim of philosophy to give a coherent account of experience as a whole" (204) but also "it is the Christian realistic contention that only if the revelational postulate be granted is it possible to construct a fully integrated philosophy" (200). Thus, in spite of his disparagement of coherence as a test for truth or an apologetic advantage for Christian philosophy, he appears to advocate it as the goal of philosophy and presents Christian philosophy as the only really coherent system.

This may well be a necessary confusion, inherent in every thinker who sees the problems of coherence as a test for truth and yet fails to see that it is the only possible method. It is akin to the problem of the rejection of introspection in psychology and just as futile. The argument against coherence is usually advanced by the high motive that *gloria soli deo*, but the result seems to be the emasculation of the great apologetic witness in the inscripturated revelation of God.

3. *Empiricism.* Though Dr. Young clearly repudiates the empirical philosophies, he seems to build his own upon an experiential starting point. "The Christian world-view begins with a vital experience" (203). He has previously presented "the God Who has revealed Himself" as the philosophical starting point, but now seems to revert to a subjective, empirical event. No doubt, he has in mind the distinctions of logical

and synoptic starting points, but in such a critical, concluding argument such distinctions should have been lucidly presented.

The skillful instructor will easily clarify these foregoing areas, and will find great advantages in the use of this book as a text. This volume follows quite closely the format and content of the very popular *Introduction* of Edgar S. Brightman, and, perhaps for this reason, gives a greater portion of discussion to personalistic idealism than would seem to be warranted by its prevalence in contemporary philosophy. By and large it is a wholesome and helpful work and should be given careful consideration as a classroom tool by every Christian professor of philosophy.

—Donald Tweedie, Jr.

Evolution as a Process, edited by J. Huxley, A. C. Hardy, and E. B. Ford. London: Allen & Unwin (distributed by Macmillan), 1954. 367 pp. $4.25.

For those who desire a first-rate reflection of various facets of current neo-Darwinian thought this is the finest compilation that the reviewer has seen. It is helpful for the interested reader to be able to find in one place a variety of applications of the methodology of a dominant school of evolutionary theory by leading workers in the field. Too much criticism of theories of biological process has been predicated upon incomplete knowledge and it is therefore hoped that works of this nature may at least aid in the attainment of informed analysis.

The book is not aimed at the casual reader but demands a fair biological background. However, the careful student with the aid of a biological dictionary could scarcely fail to follow the thesis of the nineteen articles. The lead chapter by the principal editor sets the tone of the book and provides both a clear outline of the philosophy of the neo-Darwinian selection school and a concise summary of the role of the research discussed in the rest of the book.

A criticism of the thesis cannot be made within the limits of this review, but the following quotations may reveal the theory behind this endeavor. Huxley maintains that "a single basic mechanism underlies the whole of organic evolution — Darwinian selection acting upon the genetic mechanism" (2). Also: "All evolution takes place in relation to the environment, including the biological environment, and its changes. There is a universal process of adaptation, though this may take very various forms, from material adjustment of parts of the gene-complex to the development of elaborate organs serving particular biological ends . . . Evolution (also) shows the same kinds of long-term trends in all

groups — specialization, advance in general efficiency, adaptive radiation, and, in most lines, restriction and final stability" (2).

The articles which comprise the remainder of the book, while of varied worth and of rhetorically rough profile due to the number of authors and differences in subject matter, are supposed to integrate with the above foundation. Just how substantial the structure may be is a judgment that each reader must make for himself. As an article of faith of a large number of biologists today, it deserves at least our attention that we may essay to provide a more satisfactory framework for the paleontological and modern data of biology.

—*Thomas H. Leith*

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

T. H. LEITH

American Historical Review, July 1955, H. R. MURPHY, "The Ethical Revolt Against Christian Orthodoxy in Early Victorian England."

American Journal of Sociology, May 1955, R. LETOURNEAU, "Social Change in the Muslim Cities of North Africa"; G. SIMMEL, "A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion"; W. G. SUMNER, "Religion and the Mores"; J. M. MECKLIN, "The Passing of the Saint"; A. W. SMALL, "The Church and Class Conflicts"; E. FARIS, "The Sect and the Sectarian."

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1955, an issue on "Internal Security and Civil Rights."

Atlantic Monthly, June 1955, G. R. HARRISON, "Albert Einstein" and H. C. MESSERVE, "The New Piety."

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, May 1955, B. ELLIS, "Has the Universe a Beginning in Time?" and S. E. TOULMIN, "Is there a Fundamental Problem in Ethics?"

Bible Translator, July 1955, C. K. BARRETT, "New Testament Commentaries."

Bibliotheca Sacra, April 1955, M. F. UNGER, "Great Archaeological Discoveries and their Bearing upon the Old Testament." Part Two of a series. Also, B. RAMM, "The Existential Interpretation of Doctrine (Part One)."

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1955, a special issue on "Secrecy, Security, and Loyalty." Also, MAY, J. ROTBLAT, "The Hydrogen-Uranium Bomb"; and June, H. J. MULLER, "The Genetic Damage Produced by Radiation."

Calvin Forum, June-July 1955, J. P. A. MEKKES, "The Philosophy of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd." See also the April and May issues for varied articles on Cornelius Van Til's view of common grace. The May issue also has an interesting article on Dutch art and Calvinism and another on the Christian and philosophy.

Christian Graduate, March 1955, R. V. G. TASKER, "The Doctrine of Justification by Faith in Romans"; C. SAVERY, "Robert Grosseteste; A Reformer before the Reformation"; and D. JOHNSON, "The word 'Fundamentalist' ". The June issue contains an article on "A Christian World-View" by B. F. HARRIS.

Christian Scholar, June 1955, E. W. LEFEVER, "The Protestant Non-political Approach to Politics"; P. H. PHENIX, "The Scientific Faith of American Scientists"; J. E. DIRKS, "The Responsibility of Higher Education in Society."

Confluence, April 1955, S. E. AHLSTRON, "The Levels of Religious Revival"; W. L. MILLER, "The 'Religious Revival' and American Politics"; JACOB TAUBES, "On the Symbolic Order of American Democracy"; and C. J. FRIEDRICH, "Religion and History."

Ethics, April 1955, E. JORDAN, "The Philosophic Problem of Religion." Also K. W. THOMPSON, "Toynbee's Approach to History Reviewed" in the July issue.

Evangelical Quarterly, April 1955, H. P. V. NUNN, "The use of Myth and Symbol in Religious Thought" and G. CUILVERS, "Angels."

Facts Forum News, April 1955, "Origin and Purposes of the United Nations" and in the June issue an article by the same author on "Security Investigations."

Foreign Affairs, F. TANNENBAUM, "The Future of Democracy in Latin America" and C. W. DE KIEWIET, "African Dilemmas." Also in the July issue an article by J. S. WALKER, "Thermonuclear Reactions: Can They be used for Man's Benefit?"

Harpers, April 1955, L. J. HALLE, "Why We are losing Latin America" and P. F. DRUCKER, "The Promise of Automation." By the latter author there is an article in the June issue on "Eleven Coming Issues in Politics."

Hibbert Journal, April 1955, E. B. CASTLE, "Ends and Means in Education"; J. H. THOMAS, "The Christology of Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth"; and F. H. HIENEMANN and E. L. ALLEN, "Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature", a regular feature. The July issue has papers by E. MARMORSTEIN on "The Morality of Foreign Concessions"; W. A. HALL, "Religious Experience as a Court of Appeal"; and G. MACGREGOR, "Does Scripture Limit the Power of God?"

His, May 1955, C. S. LEWIS, "The World's Last Night."

International Affairs, T. BALOGH on "The Challenge of Totalitarian Planning in Asia" and J. D. HARGREAVES, "Western Democracy and African Society" in the July 1955 issue. The April issue contains a paper on "Toynbee's Study of History" by CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

International Review of Missions, July 1955, E. A. ASAMOA, "The Christian Church and African Heritage."

Isis, June 1955, an extremely valuable critical bibliography on the history of science and its cultural influences.

Journal of Consulting Psychology, June 1955, S. E. WAXENBERG, "Psychosomatic Patients and other Physically Ill Patients."

Journal of Higher Education, March 1955, R. L. KETCHAM and M. O. SAWYER, "An Honors Program for Gifted Students." *Gordon College has recently initiated a unique program in this field.* The April issue has an article by T. W. ORGAN on "Integration in Higher Education" and the June issue contains "Revitallizing the Humanities in the Small College" by P. J. ALDUS.

Journal of History of Ideas, June 1955, R. WELTER, "The Idea of Progress in America."

Journal of Philosophy, June 9, 1955, D. C. HODGES, "Ethics without Morality."

Main Currents in Modern Thought, May 1955, C. A. COULSON, "Science and Religion" and H. MARGENAU, "Knowledge, Faith and Physics."

Nation, June 11, 1955, H. HART, "From Clubs to Cobalt Bombs". The issue of the 18th is a special issue on atoms for peace with articles by BERTRAND RUSSELL, BRONOWSKI, SACHS, LONSDALE, and BERNSTEIN. The June 25 issue has a paper by ESPINASSE on the relation of biology to varied 'atomic' bombs.

Nature, April 16, E. OROWAN, "The Origin of Man." There is an excellent discussion of Science and Responsibility in the May 28 issue.

Philosophical Quarterly, July 1955, J. WREN-LEWIS, "Modern Philosophy and the Doctrine of the Trinity."

Philosophical Review, June 1955. Three papers on "The problem of Natural Rights."

Philosophy, April 1955, A. Duncan-Jones, "The Notion of Conscience" and A. Macbeath, "The Need for a Social Philosophy."

Philosophy of Science, April 1955, G. Sjoberg, "The Comparative Method in the Social Sciences." Also K. E. Bock, "Darwin and Social Theory."

Political Science Quarterly, June 1955, V. M. Barnett. "Competitive Coexistence and the Communist Challenge in Italy."

Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, April 15, 1955, J. H. Hildebrand, "The Social Responsibility of Scientists" and June 15, Arnold Toynbee, "The Ottoman Empire in World History."

Religious Education, July-August, 1955, a symposium on "Religion in the Public Schools."

Saturday Review, May 7. The entire issue deals with British Writers and Writing Today. The June 4 and 11 issues have interesting discussion by J. W. Krutch on "Are the Humanities Worth Saving?" The issue of July 2 has a paper on the censorship questions in libraries. Hill and Ayars have an interesting section in the July 30 issue on "More Money for our Colleges" which should challenge all friends of Christian education.

Reporter, April 4, 1955 contains a fine article on Automation by R. Bendiner.

Scientific Monthly, April 1955, W. E. Todd et al, "National Defence Against Atomic Attack." Also, August, J. R. Nielsen, "Our Responsibilities as Scientists."

United Nations Review, June 1955, a fine survey of the first ten years. The August issue reports on the discussion in San Francisco.

Yale Review, Summer 1955, F. G. Kilgour, "How Good are our Science and Engineering?". A very timely article.

New Publications

Progressive Calvinism, a new periodical published monthly by the league of the above name. It intends to pioneer in social thought and research by defending the thesis that success of one's self and of others is a desirable ethical aim. This is attained by living and promoting Biblical ideas of successful living and by recognizing that modern social science may cast much light upon Biblical ethics. Highly stimulating and most pertinent. The address is 366 E. 166 Street, South Holland, Illinois.